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Abstract
We analyze the implications of European bank consolidation on the default risk of
acquiring banks. For a sample of 134 bidding banks, we employ the Merton distance
to default model to show that, on average, bank mergers are risk neutral. However,
for the least risky banks, mergers generate a signicant increase in default risk. This
result is particularly pronounced for cross-border and activity-diversifying deals as well
as for deals completed under weak bank regulatory regimes. Also, large deals, which
pose organizational and procedural hurdles, experience a merger-related increase in
default risk. Our results cast doubt on the ability of bank merger activity to exert a
risk-reducing and stabilizing e¤ect on the European banking industry.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the default risk e¤ects of mergers and acquisitions (M&A)
for a sample of European bidding banks. In the past two decades, consecutive waves of consolidation
have transformed the European banking industry. M&A has widened the scale and scope of banking
rms and led to a sharp increase in concentration levels in most banking markets. Recently, this
asset consolidation process has been given further impetus by the nancial crisis which emphasized
the role of acquisitions as a means to prevent bank failures and costly bank bailouts by policy makers
(see Group of Thirty, 2009). However, whether bank mergers are e¤ective in reducing default risk
and contribute to a more stable banking sector remains an open question.
Previous work on risk-taking and bank mergers does not analyze default risk, but relies
instead on accounting (e.g. z-scores) or equity-based indicators of risk (which estimate a market
model to decompose bank stock returns into systematic and idiosyncratic risk). However, equity-
based measures of banking risk are unable to provide a direct assessment of default likelihood, and
accounting measures of risk have little power to predict distress for US banks (Evano¤ and Wall,
2001; IMF, 2009). Our analysis, by contrast, estimates the changes in default risk around bank
mergers based on a Merton distance to default (DD) model which draws on both accounting and
market data. The critical advantage of this method is that it implicitly captures a banks expected
returns via the inclusion of the market value of assets. Gropp et al. (2006) show that DD scores are
an appropriate indicator of bank fragility for European banks which even outperform pure market
measures of risk such as subordinated bond spreads.
Risk considerations may be linked to merger strategies with di¤erent outcomes for the risk-
iness of the resulting institution. Two themes surface in the literature on the risk implications
of bank M&A: consolidation delivers diversication e¤ects (and reduces risk) or, alternatively, the
risk e¤ects of consolidation are shaped by regulatory incentives (which may induce an increase in
risk). As regards risk diversication strategies behind M&A, a number of simulation studies esti-
mate the diversication potential of bank M&A. These studies report that bank M&A lowers the
default probability of US institutions as a result of portfolio diversication (Emmons et al., 2004),
geographic diversication (Hughes et al., 1999), and activity diversication (e.g. through mergers
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between banking and insurance rms (Boyd et al., 1993; Estrella, 2001)). However, the results of
simulation studies should be interpreted with care, because they disregard the organizational com-
plexity, operational ine¢ ciencies, and changes in bank strategy associated with acquisitions (Hughes
et al., 1999; Knapp et al., 2005). Akhavein et al. (1997) show that geographic diversication may
leave the overall level of risk una¤ected if banks against the background of a more diversied loan
portfolio sharply increase lending in the post-merger period.1
Consistent with the argument that mergers are complex and their risk e¤ects uncertain ex
ante, studies that focus on the realized risk diversication e¤ects of US bank mergers have produced
mixed ndings. While Mishra et al. (2005) nd merger-related synergies reduce both total and
idiosyncratic risk for a sample of 14 US bank acquirers, other studies question the relevance of risk
diversication as a major force behind bank mergers. Amihud et al. (2002) nd cross-border bank
mergers do not reduce the market risk of acquiring banks. Similar results are found by Craig and
Santos (1997) for US bank mergers on the basis of accounting-based measures of risk. In a related
study, Craig and Santos (1996) provide further evidence against risk diversication as a motive for
mergers by showing that acquired banks tend to be transformed post-M&A to resemble the strategic
features of the acquiring institution.
Next to diversication e¤ects, regulatory regimes may also give rise to a risk-related motive
behind bank M&A. Elyasiani and Jia (2008) point out that banks with a high default risk face
increased scrutiny by regulators and are more likely to be subjected to regulatory intervention.
In cases where institutional failure appears imminent, regulators may even intervene and engineer
deals (see Koetter et al., 2007). Further, stricter regulatory regimes may generally be more e¤ective
1The extent to which diversication in banking is associated with measurable risk reduction benets remains
debated. It appears that, if they exist at all, risk reduction benets from diversication are small. For a sample of
Italian banks, Acharya et al. (2006) nd that only risky banks benet from loan diversication and achieve lower risk.
Other European studies show that more diversied banking activities do not lead to risk reduction benets (Baele et
al., 2007; Lepetit et al., 2008; Mercieca et al., 2007). At a macro level, Wagner (2008) suggests that diversication
by lowering banksneed for outside liquidity encourages risk-taking and, because it exposes banks to similar type
risks, discourages the provision of liquidity to other institutions. Diversication may, thus, increase the likelihood of
a systemic crisis.
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in containing risk-taking in the context of mergers. Buch and DeLong (2008) show for a sample of
cross-border mergers that deals lead to a reduction in return variability (total risk) if the regulatory
regime in the home market is stricter than the target bank regime.
The operation of bank bailout policies and deposit insurance schemes also give rise to well-
dened moral hazard problems in the context of M&A and may lead to a merger-related increase in
default risk. For instance, underpriced deposit insurance schemes may encourage banks to enhance
their deposit subsidy through mergers that increase the risk and size of an institution with the
purpose of becoming too-big-to-fail (John et al., 1991). However, the empirical evidence that banks
use mergers for regulatory arbitrage or to extract deposit insurance benets has hitherto been weak
(Benston et al., 1995; Buch and DeLong, 2008).2
In this paper, we analyze the default risk implications of M&A on acquiring banks from
Europe. We start by showing that the average European bank merger does not a¤ect the default
risk of the acquirer. Next, we show this result also holds for merger types which o¤er the a priori
largest scope for risk-related diversication benets (i.e. cross-border and product diversifying
M&A). By contrast, the least risky bidders increase their default risk in the post-merger period.
Further, the possibility of merger-related increases in risk is particularly pronounced for the least
risky banks when deals are diversifying and/or completed under a bank regulatory regime in the
country of the biding bank which is relatively weak.
Our results point to di¢ culties in achieving sustainable risk reduction benets from bank
M&A, especially for banks which are already well-diversied. We also show that prudential regu-
lation plays a role in preventing risk-increasing deals. Further, the regression analysis consistently
identies larger deals as causing an increase in bidder default risk. The overall results are critical
of bank mergers exerting a risk-reducing and, thus, stabilizing e¤ect on the safety and soundness of
the banking sector in Europe.
Our analysis adds to the existing literature on mergers and banking risk in several ways. First,
2Benston et al. (1995) examine takeover premiums in the US banking industry in the 1980s. The authors report
that takeover premiums reect a targets potential earning diversication over the ability of the merged institution to
extract gains from deposit insurance.
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this paper is the rst to study the realized risk implications of bank M&A by adopting a distance to
default model. The Merton DD model boasts a wide range of empirical (e.g., Akhigbe et al., 2007;
Vassalou and Xing, 2004) and commercial applications (including as a risk management tool in the
banking industry; see Gropp et al., 2006). Second, to the best of our knowledge, this paper o¤ers
the rst assessment of the risk e¤ects of mergers on European bidders. Europe o¤ers a particularly
suitable setting in which to examine the risk e¤ects of bank consolidation. Owing to the established
practice of universal banking in a number of European countries, banks in Europe have been in
a position to employ M&A to engage in activity diversication to a degree which has only been
possible for US banks following the passing of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999. Further, in the
absence of synchronized business cycles across EU member states, cross-border mergers in European
banking may o¤er potentially large diversication benets. These diversication benets are further
underpinned by a number of policy initiatives aimed at promoting the cross-border consolidation of
banks which have substantially lowered the entry barriers for banks when engaging in geographical
diversication (see Hernando et al., 2009).
Third, we contribute to the literature on the performance of bank M&A. The lack of empir-
ical work that reports either positive wealth e¤ects for bidding bank shareholders or performance
improvements surrounding European bank M&A (see Campa and Hernando, 2006; Beitel et al.,
2004) continues to raise questions as to who benets from bank consolidation. The default risk
implications of bank M&A are important for shareholders to understand. In the event of institu-
tional failure and a bailout by regulators, bank shareholders unlike other creditor groups tend not
to be shielded from substantial wealth losses. On the other hand, given the call option properties
of equity which limit the downside risk for investors shareholders may benet from risk-inducing
mergers, because increases in the riskiness of the nancial institution expose them to potentially
large gains.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the sample of European
bank M&A and explains the methodology we employ to gauge changes in acquirer default risk
associated with M&A. Section 3 describes the default risk e¤ects by acquisition type, and Section 4
identies some of the drivers of default risk in a multivariate setting. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Data and Methodology
2.1 Merger Sample
The sample of bank M&A is obtained from Thomson Financial (SDC Platinum). The selected
mergers are announced and completed between 1992 and 2007 and involve bidders located in the
European Union (EU-15), Norway and Switzerland. Bidding rms are commercial banks, bank
holding companies and credit institutions, while targets may also be insurance companies (life and
accident), mortgage bankers, as well as security brokers. Further, bidding banks are listed with
equity returns available on Datastream and accounting data on Worldscope.
From an initial sample of 197 bank mergers, we drop deals due to one of the following reasons:
In order to avoid confounding events, there need to be at least 180 trading days between separate
merger announcements and not more than one deal pending until 180 days following completion
of a deal by the same bank. As a result of this criterion, we lose 54 deals. We then veried the
deal characteristics from SDC (announcement date, deal value) against news articles from various
sources on LexisNexis. Inconsistencies between the data obtained from Thomson Financial and the
press coverage of individual transactions were corrected or, if left unresolved, deals were omitted
from our sample. Uncertainty over deal characteristics led to the omission of 9 deals. Finally, while
none of the remaining banks are failing banks, we ensured our sample did not contain mergers where
the target was a failing bank as indicated by either SDC or the press coverage surrounding a deal.
We do not stipulate a minimum size requirement. This is because we aim to examine the risk
e¤ects of the entire population of European bank mergers for which market and accounting data
are available. Further, the vast majority of deals we include in our sample are su¢ ciently large to
expect a measurable impact on the riskiness of the acquiring institution. In our sample, average
relative size (measured as the ratio of deal value to the market value of the bidder) stands at 44%.
However, to ensure our results are not sensitive to the relative size of a merger, we perform the
analysis using minimum relative size requirements of 5% (which reduces the sample size n to 101)
and 10% (n=87). The results of our analysis are invariant to the imposition of these relative size
requirements. Both the univariate tests and regression models yield qualitatively identical results
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to those reported below. We return to this in the robustness section.
[Table 1 near here]
The resulting dataset is described in Table 1. The sample consists of 134 acquisitions with
bidders mainly operating in Italy (30), the UK (16) and Spain (14). In addition, the majority of
the sampled deals (70) was announced over the period 1997-2001. It is worth emphasizing that
the consolidation of bank assets in a number of European economies has chiey involved non-listed
public sector and cooperative institutions (Hernando et al., 2009) which face increasing pressures to
consolidate as a result of declines in government ownership or the phasing out of public guarantees
of their liabilities.
2.2 Methodology: Merger-related Changes in Default Risk
To estimate merger-related changes in the default risk of bidding banks, we apply the Merton
distance to default (DD) model as in Akhigbe et al. (2007) and Gropp et al. (2006). Default
risk is measured as the number of standard deviations that the market value of bank assets are
above default point (the point where the market value of assets is less than the book value of total
liabilities). Formally, DD on day t is expressed as:
DDt =
ln (VA;t/Lt) +

rf   0:52A;t

T
A;tT
; (1)
where VA;t is the market value of assets, Lt is the book value of total liabilities, rf is the risk-free
rate (proxied by the yield on two-year German government bonds), A;t is the annualized asset
volatility at t, and T is the time to maturity (conventionally set to 1 year).
The computation of DD t requires estimates of VA;t and A;t neither of which is directly
observable. Following Akhigbe et al. (2007), Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Hillegeist et al. (2004),
we infer the values of VA;t and A;t through an iterative process based on the Black-Scholes-Merton
pricing model. Specically, we express the market value of a rms equity (VE;t) as a function of
the asset value by solving the following system of nonlinear equations:
VE;t = VA;tN(d1;t) XterfTN(d2;t) (2)
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E;t =
VA;te
 TN(d1;t)A;t
VE
(3)
Equation (2) denes VE;t as a call option on the market value of the bidders total assets, with
d1;t =
ln(VA;t/Lt)+(rf+0:52A;t)T
A;tT
and d2;t = d1;t A;t
p
T . Equation (3) is the optimal hedge equation
that relates the standard deviation of a bidders equity value to the standard deviation of the value
of total assets (both on an annualized basis).
To solve this system of equations, we employ as starting values for A;t the historical volatility
of equity (computed daily on the basis of a 90-trading day rolling window) multiplied by the ratio
of the market value of equity and the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of total
liabilities, i.e. A;t = E;tVE;t/(VE;t + Lt). A Newton search algorithm identies the daily values of
VA;t and A;t in an iterative process which we then employ to compute DD t as in (1).
The merger-related change in bidder distance to default is the di¤erence in mean DD before
the merger (over a-180 days to a-11 days relative to the merger announcement date a) and mean
DD after completion (over c+11 days to c+180 days following the completion date c). We choose
this time window to reduce the level of noise inherent in DD and to ensure that our default risk
predictions are based on accounting data that relate to the post-merger period.
We eliminate general industry and time trends in risk by computing a daily default risk index
for each banking sector. For every deal, we compute a DD market index as the value-weighted DD
of all banks listed on Datastream in the bidders country which are not involved in M&A during the
merger announcement and e¤ective window.3 We then subtract changes between the pre-merger
and post-merger value in the market default index from changes in DD that acquirers realize over
the same time period. The industry-adjusted change in distance to default (IADD) for bidding
3Following the application of these index criteria, the number of constituent banks in Finland, Austria, and
Luxembourg declined substantially, rising concerns about the ability of our index to accurately capture banking
sector risk in these countries. As a result, we aggregate some countries based on their geographic proximity. We
create a Scandinavian banking sector default risk index (Finland, Norway & Sweden), a Benelux index (Luxembourg,
Belgium & The Netherlands), and a German-Austrian index.
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banks that is due to M&A can, thus, be expressed as:
IADD = DD(c+11;c+180)  DD(a 180;a 11)  
 
DDindex;(c+11;c+180)  DDindex;(a 180;a 11)

= DDbidder  DDindex
(4)
3 Bank Mergers and Bidder Default Risk
3.1 Default Risk Changes by Deal Type
Bank mergers o¤er opportunities to realize size-related diversication gains through risk pooling as
long as the asset returns of the banks involved in M&A are less than perfectly correlated (Emmons
et al., 2004; Craig and Santos, 1997). To the extent that European bank consolidation enhances
protability through increased market power in the post-merger period as well as changes in the
management of the assets of the combined institution, M&A may lower the default risk of bidding
banks even further. In this section, we examine the default risk implications of European bank
M&A in general as well as for specic types of deals. Overall, the results we present below are not
consistent with bank M&A generating measurable default risk e¤ects.
Table 2 reports the pre- and post-merger values for industry-adjusted distance to default
(IADD) based on our sample of 134 bank mergers. The results show that before M&A European
bidding banks are riskier than their industry peers. Mean (median) industry-adjusted DD in the
pre-merger period is -0.110 (-0.288) and median IADD is statistically di¤erent from zero (at the
1%-level). To analyze whether mergers impact default risk, we test if the mean (median) merger-
related change in IADD is equal to zero. Although half the number of deals generate an increase
in industry-adjusted DD (i.e. lower default risk), Table 2 shows that mergers do not produce a
statistically signicant reduction in the riskiness of acquiring banks. Consequently, distance to
default on average neither increases nor decreases in the post-merger period.
[Table 2 near here]
Next, we test if the risk e¤ects of bank mergers vary by the type of deal undertaken. The
potential for merger-related risk reductions is particularly pronounced for either geographically- or
activity-diversifying mergers, because both deal types have the potential to substantially lower the
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volatility of bank prots (Estrella, 2001; Boyd et al., 1993). On the other hand, diversifying mergers
may lead to increased organizational complexity and/or signicant changes in post-merger strategy
which may thwart bidders from realizing risk benets as a result of M&A.
Table 3 reports the distance to default e¤ects of deals that can be classied as either cross-
border or cross-industry (dened as deals where acquirer and the target do not share the same
two-digit SIC code) compared with deals that are domestic or activity-focusing. Panel A of Table 3
focuses on geographic diversication, while Panel B analyzes the e¤ect of product diversication on
IADD. The results o¤er further evidence that European bank mergers do not e¤ect on the acquirers
distance to default. While a majority of bidders exhibits a decline in industry-adjusted risk following
diversifying mergers, the di¤erences are not statistically signicant. Regardless of the increased
potential for risk diversication exhibited by cross-border and cross-industry bank mergers, the
mean (median) change in IADD is not statistically di¤erent from zero for either diversifying or
focusing deals.
[Table 3 near here]
Finally, we examine if supervisory regimes inuence the risk e¤ects of bank M&A. Under
weaker supervisory regimes, banks may increase their risk-taking via M&A in order to shift the risk
of default to regulators (Amihud et al. 2002). This way, bidding banks could manage to extract
economic benets from regulatory guarantees through implicit or explicit bank bailout policies
(Benston et al. 1995). More stringent bank regulators, by contrast, will be able to contain risk-
taking in the context of bank mergers. Consistent with this, Buch and DeLong (2008) show that
bidding bank shareholders that operate under a strict bank regulatory regime experience a reduction
in the variance of equity returns following cross-border bank mergers.
To test for the e¤ect of bank regulation on default risk, we employ the index of supervisory
strength from the Barth et al. (2004) database.4 Higher values indicate environments in which
regulators possess more powers to take actions against undesirable behavior by banks. Panel C of
4The index measures bank supervisory strength as the equal-weighted sum (incl. sub-questions) of the follow-
ing questions (yes=1; no=0): (1) Does the supervisory agency have the right to meet with external auditors to
discuss reports without the approval of the bank? (2) Are the auditors required to communicate misconduct by
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Table 3 classies regulatory regimes as having high (low) supervisory power for index values above
(below) the sample median. The results show that the strength of the acquirers regulator does not
impact the riskiness of bank acquisitions. Stricter regulatory regimes are, thus, unable to prevent
risk-taking in M&A. It is interesting to note, however, that bidding banks in the low supervisory
power group exhibit above-industry levels of risk as indicated by negative IADD values in the pre-
merger period (median highly signicant), while the same is not true for the subset of banks in the
high supervisory power group. This may be interpreted as an indication that the industry-adjusted
risk prole of bidding banks varies with the ability of bank supervisors to curb risky behavior.
3.2 Pre-merger Risk and Merger-related Changes in Default Risk
Next, we examine whether the default risk exhibited by bidding banks prior to a deal determines
the risk implications of M&A. Our rationale for expecting that the default risk implications of bank
M&A vary with the level of pre-merger risk is based on Acharya et al. (2006) and Brewer (1989)
who report that high-risk banks benet disproportionately from diversication.
Table 4 ranks bidding banks into quartile portfolios according to their pre-merger IADD. The
percentage of bidding banks with a positive change in IADD (i.e. that experience a reduction in
default risk via M&A) declines rapidly across risk quartiles from 62% for high-risk banks (Q1) to
27% for low-risk banks (Q4). Critically, while merger-related changes in IADD are positive in Q1
(not statistically signicant at customary levels), changes in IADD are negative in Q4 (signicant
managers/directors to the supervisory agency? (3) Can legal action against external auditors be taken by supervisors
for negligence? (4) Can supervisors force banks to change internal organizational structure? (5) Are o¤-balance
sheet items disclosed to supervisors? (6) Can the supervisory agency order directors/management to constitute pro-
visions to cover actual/potential losses? (7) Can the supervisory agency suspend directors decision to distribute: a)
Dividends? b) Bonuses? c) Management fees? (8) Can the supervisory agency supercede bank shareholder rights
and declare a bank insolvent? (9) Does banking law allow supervisory agency to suspend some or all ownership
rights of a problem bank? (10) Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can the supervisory agency or
any other government agency do the following: a) suspend shareholder rights? b) remove and replace management?
c) Remove and replace directors? We obtain updated values on regulatory variables from the Worldbank website
(http://go.worldbank.org/SNUSW978P0) and construct the index such that we use the prevailing index value in the
bidding bank country during the year of the acquisition.
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below 5% according to both the t-test and the z-test). This indicates that the least risky banks
experience an increase in default risk as a result of M&A. It could, therefore, be argued that bank
mergers cause low-risk banks to lose part of their risk advantage vis-à-vis national banking sectors.
[Table 4 near here]
The result that low-risk banks experience a deterioration in default risk could be due to it
being unlikely that low-risk institutions realize further diversication benets through mergers. The
complexity of deals and di¢ culties in achieving sustainable gains from M&A are well-documented
(see Hughes et al., 1999). Also, changes in post-M&A strategy may cause a risk increase, for
example if the acquiring bank expands its loan book (Akhavein et al., 1997). However, our results
on pre-merger risk and deal-induced changes in IADD could equally be consistent with explanations
that emphasize either the diversication benets or the regulatory incentives inherent in M&A.
Diversication benets should be particularly associated with cross-border and activity-diversifying
mergers in the high-risk quartile (and less so in the low-risk group). By contrast, if regulatory
strength across the EU has an impact on the risk e¤ects of M&A, we would expect that the prospect
of regulatory intervention is highest for the riskiest institutions (see Elyasiani and Jia, 2008) and
that regulators are particularly e¤ective in curbing risk-taking through mergers for this group of
banks (and less so for the low-risk group).
Tables 5 and 6 analyze the diversication hypothesis and the regulatory inuence hypothesis,
respectively. Panel A of Table 5 focuses on the risk e¤ects of domestic and cross-border bank mergers
for the high- and low-risk quartile of banks.5 The results show there is no statistically signicant
risk e¤ect on bidding banks from cross-border mergers for the riskiest institutions. For low-risk
institutions, we observe an increase in default risk (i.e. a reduction in IADD) following cross-border
deals (t- and z-statistic are signicant 5% and 10%, respectively). In Panel B, we observe very
similar results for diversication on the basis of the activities that merging rms engage in. In the
5While we examine the risk e¤ects of diversication for each risk quartile, we only report the results for the lowest
and highest risk-quartile in order to conserve space. We do not nd statistically signicant di¤erences between focusing
and diversifying mergers other than those reported in Table 5 and thereafter.
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group of high-risk banks, by contrast, we nd only weak evidence that product diversication lowers
default risk (rank statistic signicant at 10%-level). Thus, we observe that diversication (in terms
of both geography and activities) is risk-neutral for risky banks, but generates an increase in default
risk for the portfolio of the least risky institutions.
[Table 5 & Table 6 near here]
Generally, our results are critical of the diversication potential of bank mergers. This is very
much in the spirit of a wider literature which does not report gains from US bank mergers (Sha¤er,
1994; Akhavein et al., 1997). Consistent with this, most studies that examine the risk e¤ects of
income diversication on European banks have not found any evidence that diversication lowers
bank risk (Baele et al., 2007; Lepetit et al., 2008; Mercieca et al., 2007). Wagner (2008) argues
that by increasing homogeneity amongst nancial institutions, diversication limits their ability to
share risk, thereby, increasing the likelihood of a systemic crisis.
Table 6 reports IADD for high-risk and low-risk banks by supervisory strength in the bidders
country. The results conrm the regulatory hypothesis only for low-risk banks which increase
their default risk when regulatory power is low. By contrast, the M&A risk e¤ects for high-risk
institutions are not a¤ected by the power of the supervisory regime. This shows bank regulators
are unable to contain risk-taking under regimes with fewer disciplinary powers (Buch and DeLong
2008). However, since merger-related risk-taking under weak regimes is conned to the low-risk
group, we do not interpret this nding as consistent with banks exploiting weaker regimes to shift
risk onto regulators. Rather, it seems more likely that the least risky banks attract relatively less
scrutiny under a weaker regulatory regime.
In sum, we nd that the risk e¤ects produced by mergers partly depend on pre-merger risk.
We observe that the most risky banks do not benet from M&A, while the least risky experience
an increase in default risk following a deal. Further, the merger-related increase in risk for the
least risky banks is driven by cross-border and activity-diversifying mergers. Also, we show that
risk-taking via M&A amongst the group of least risky banks is prevalent in weaker regulatory
environments.
So far, our analysis considers pre-merger risk, diversication, and the regulatory environment.
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However, it is conceivable that our main result above the deterioration in default risk for the least
risky banks following M&A is linked to specic strategies or pre-merger characteristics of the
acquirer. For this reason, the following section examines changes in industry-adjusted distance to
default (IADD) for European bank mergers in a multivariate setting.
4 The Determinants of Changes in Default Risk
We assess how merger-related risk changes are a¤ected by deal characteristics and pre-merger fun-
damentals of the acquirer. Our model, estimated via OLS with robust standard errors, assumes the
following specication:
IADDi = 0 + 
0
DCi + 
0
ACi:t 1 + "i (5)
where:
 IADDi is the merger-related change in industry-adjusted distance to default (see Section 2);
 DCi is a (k1) vector of merger characteristics, and
 ACi;t 1 is a (j1) vector of acquiring bank characteristics at the end of the scal year before
the announcement of the merger
Among other variables, the vector of deal characteristics controls for the method of payment,
the status of the target bank, and deal size. The payment method is captured by a dummy variable
which equals one if the deal is fully paid for in cash and zero otherwise (CASHONLY). Furne
and Rosen (2009) suggest that fully cash-nanced mergers are likely to increase bidder risk, because
bidders are substituting safe liquid assets with the (more risky) balance sheet of the target. Further,
we consider the status of the target by distinguishing via a dummy variable between publicly-listed
and private target rms (LISTED). We expect bank mergers involving listed targets to produce
positive risk e¤ects, because listed rms are likely to be larger and, thus, more diversied than
private targets. Also, the increased disclosure requirements pertaining to public rms facilitate
e¤ective due diligence by bidding banks with positive implications for the bidders risk assessment
capabilities.
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Deal value is measured by the logarithmic transformation of the US dollar value of acquisitions
(LDEALV). Deal size can a¤ect the risk prole of the acquirer in several ways. Larger deals may
produce more diversication benets and reduce the default risk of the acquiring bank. However,
larger mergers are also more complex to integrate into the context of the bidding bank and may lead
to institutions which are organizationally more complex (Knapp et al., 2005). In the immediate
aftermath of a deal, large mergers may, therefore, cause an increase in default risk. Since deal
values which are small in absolute terms may still yield similar type risk e¤ects than large deals
for small acquirers, we include a measure of relative size as the ratio of deal value to the market
value of the acquirers equity at the end of one year before the deal announcement (RELSIZE) in
the regressions.
Echoing the univariate tests on the diversication e¤ects of bank mergers above, we capture
if deals entail geographic diversication (cross-border versus domestic mergers, CROSSB) or ac-
tivity diversication (focusing versus diversifying mergers, CONGLOMERATE). Also, we test if
highly-specialized mergers which are both geographically and activity-focusing a¤ect our default
risk measure (DOMESTICFOCUS).
Moving on to the vector of acquiring bank characteristics, we consider measures of pre-merger
performance and size. Some of these variables are related to agency explanations of M&A which
stress potential conicts between managers and shareholders as regards the deployment of corporate
resources and the riskiness of the institution (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). For example, declining
market performance can be interpreted as an indicator that managers are entrenched and may act
against the interests of shareholders. We measure pre-merger market performance (PREMERGER-
PERF) using industry-adjusted buy and hold returns on the bidding banks equity over a period
from -180 to -11 days relative to the deal announcement. Accounting performance is measured by
ROA (pre-tax prots scaled by assets). Further, the market-to-book ratio (MTBV) can be used
as a proxy for executive hubris which we expect to be negatively associated with merger-related
changes in distance to default. By contrast, Keeley (1990) argues that more valuable banks face
fewer incentives to engage in risky projects, because valuable charters cannot be sold in the event
of default.
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Berger and Bonnacorsi di Patti (2006) show that leverage reduces agency cost in banking.
Leverage increases the risk of liquidation (with the prospect of pay losses for executives) as well as
pressures to generate cash ows su¢ ciently high to cover interest payments. Consequently, managers
at banks with low leverage may be more likely to commit free cash ows to risky projects (mergers)
which increase their pay as well as the likelihood of institutional default. We control for the level
of bidder pre-merger leverage via the equity-to-assets ratio (EQUITY).6
To capture the impact of management quality on the risk e¤ects of mergers, we also include op-
erating e¢ ciency in the model, measured by the ratio of operating costs to total assets (OPCOSTS).
Further, we expect a negative inuence of acquirer size measured as the log transformation of to-
tal bank assets (SIZE) on merger-related changes in default risk. If the diversication benets of
mergers decline with bidder size, large banks face incentives to increase risk through M&A and to
extract too-big-to-fail benets from regulators (see John et al., 1991; Benston et al., 1995).
[Table 7 near here]
To assess the robustness of the univariate tests above, we control for the pre-merger risk
prole of the acquiring bank. We construct a dummy that identies low- (high-) risk bidders. This
variables equals one if the bidder is located in the highest (lowest) pre-merger DD quartile. Further,
to evaluate whether the risk implications of a deal explain the expected performance gains accruing
from a bank merger, we include the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) from -11 to +1 days relative
to the merger announcement date as in Amihud et al. (2002) and Buch and DeLong (2008). Market
model parameters are estimated using 110-day daily return observations starting from 120 days to
11 days before the acquisition announcement date supplied by Thomson Financial. We expect a
CAR to exert a negative impact on merger-related changes in default risk. This is because increases
in the risk of the acquiring bank should generate higher expected shareholder returns. Finally, we
control for the inuence of country characteristics on the risk e¤ect of mergers by including in the
6EQUITY correlates highly with total assets (r=-.67). To reduce the e¤ects of multicollinearity between capital
and size in our regressions, we regress EQUITY on total assets and enter the residuals from this estimation as an
explanatory variable into our regression. The estimated coe¢ cient, therefore, measures the e¤ect of leverage after
controlling for size.
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regression model the real GDP growth rate (RGDPG) and an asset-based Herndhal index (HH)
of national banking market concentration.
An overview of our variables and summary statistics are provided in Table 7.
4.1 The Inuence of Deal and Acquirer Characteristics
Table 8 reports the results of the regressions on merger-related changes in industry-adjusted distance
to default. The results show that various bidding bank characteristics drive merger-generated
changes in distance to default. We also conrm two of our main results above: (i) low-risk banks
increase their default risk after a merger, and (ii) diversication gains for European bidding banks
do not appear to materialize.
Deal value exerts a negative impact on the risk e¤ects of M&A (signicant at the 5%-level).
This shows that large bank mergers pose organizational and procedural hurdles in the post-merger
integration process that may thwart merger benets from materializing (Knapp et al., 2005). This
is also consistent with banks facing incentives to use mergers to become too big to fail in an attempt
to extract benets from regulators.7 Further, the negative relationship between cost e¢ ciency and
merger-induced changes in IADD (at 5%-level of signicance) can be explained by the di¢ culties
that ine¢ cient banks face in successfully completing a merger. If we interpret cost e¢ ciency as a
proxy for managerial ability, this result implies that poorly-managed banks are less likely to select
acquisition targets that lower default risk.
[Table 8 near here]
In some of the model specications, we observe a positive e¤ect of the equity-to-asset ratio on
changes in default risk. Thus, more highly-capitalized banks tend to realize higher risk reduction
7 In constrast to expectations, deal size and relative size are far from being perfectly correlated (r=.378). Therefore,
both variables o¤er di¤erent information on deal charactersitics. Furthermore, VIF tests on the estimated models
suggest that there is no evidence of multicollinearity in the regressions when the two variables are simultaneously
included. However, as a further check, we re-estimate the main models by including each size variable separately. We
continue to observe that the log of deal size enters the regression with a negative and signicant coe¢ cient, while the
low-risk dummy is signicant in all specications.
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benets from mergers. This result points to the importance of capital requirement regulations
in promoting a sound banking industry. Further, bank mergers which are completed against the
background of positive economic growth are linked to post-M&A risk reductions. While periods
of economic growth may be accompanied by excessive risk-taking, GDP growth is also likely to
increase the value of bidding bank assets, thereby, reducing the probability of default
The regression results in Table 8 conrm a number of ndings in the univariate analysis. For
instance, there are no risk diversication benets from cross-border or activity diversifying mergers
(neither CROSSB nor CONGL enter the regressions at customary levels of signicance). Also in
line with the univariate analysis, low-risk banks experience a statistically signicant increase in
default risk following M&A. The dummy variable indicating low pre-merger risk enters all model
specications with a negative sign (signicant at 5% in all specications without interaction e¤ects).
Consequently, the e¤ect which the pre-merger risk of the acquiring bank has on merger-induced risk
changes in the group of low-risk banks is not contingent on specic merger strategies or nancial
characteristics prevalent in this group of institutions.
We further investigate the interaction between pre-merger risk and diversication gains and
nd additional conrmation of our univariate results. Specically, we add interaction terms be-
tween the LOWRISK dummy and diversifying mergers (CROSSB and CONGL dummies) to the
specications and we estimate the e¤ect of the low-risk dummy on IADD for these diversifying deals
(Panel B of Table 8). We reach the same conclusion as in the univariate analysis: When low-risk
banks are involved in either geographically or product diversifying mergers, changes in IADD are
highly signicant and negative. By contrast, mergers that are simultaneously domestic and focusing
are risk neutral. This conms that increases in default risk following bank mergers are particularly
pronounced for the low-risk group of banks engaging in diversifying deals.
4.2 The Inuence of Supervisory Power
We add the supervisory power index (SUPOWER) to the regressions to examine whether regulatory
incentives motivate bank risk-taking in mergers in a multivariate framework. The results, reported
in Columns (1) to (4) of Table 9, show that the coe¢ cient on SUPOWER is not signicant at
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customary levels of signicance. Consequently, supervisors do not a¤ect risk-taking in mergers for
the entire sample.
The results in the univariate tests above indicate that deal-induced increases in risk are
strongest under weak regulatory regimes. In Columns (5) to (8), we consider the interaction be-
tween SUPOWER and LOWRISK as well as between a dummy variable which takes the value of
1 if SUPOWER in the acquiring banks country is above the sample median, and zero otherwise
(DSUPOWER). In Panel B of Table 9, we compute the marginal e¤ect of LOWRISK on changes
in IADD for di¤erent supervisory strengths. The marginal e¤ects can be interpreted as measuring
the change in IADD for low-risk banks under a given supervisory regime. As SUPOWER increases,
we expect the incentive for risk-taking should be reduced.
[Table 9 near here]
Our results conrm this expectation. When the supervisory power is high, the risk e¤ect of
mergers on low-risk bidders is not signicantly di¤erent from the risk e¤ect of M&A on the rest of
the sample. Di¤erent risk e¤ects of M&A are only observable under low and median supervisory
powers where low-risk banks see an increase in their risk of default post-M&A. Therefore, we
continue to observe that low-risk banks increase their default risk through M&A under relatively
weak supervisory regimes.
4.3 Robustness
We conducted several tests to evaluate the robustness of our results. First, we assess the stability
of our results when we impose a minimum value for RELSIZE. Although our sample includes the
largest deals in Europe, it also has a few deals where the target appears relatively small compared
to the bidder. Therefore, we re-run the analysis after imposing minimum relative size requirements
of 5% (which reduces the sample size n to 101) and 10% (n=87). The results for these sub-samples
conrm our main ndings and demonstrate that our ndings are invariant to the imposition of a
minimum size criterion. We still observe a negative and signicant risk e¤ect of mergers for low-risk
banks, especially when the supervisory regime is weak. We also continue to observe that diversifying
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deals increase default risk for the group of the least risky acquirers. Further, the regression results
are qualitatively unchanged.
Second, the risk e¤ects of M&A may be partly determined by target bank characteristics
beyond those that we have already controlled for in our analysis (e.g. via target status or the degree
of activity diversication). We test whether target characteristics such as performance, size, capital
adequacy, and operating e¢ ciency explain the risk e¤ects of M&A on bidding banks. None of these
variables enter the regressions with coe¢ cients that are statistically signicant at customary levels.
Furthermore, albeit not signicant at conventional levels, the coe¢ cients on a number of variables
(size, ROA, operating e¢ ciency) exhibit the expected sign. When we extend the model to control
for acquiring bank characteristics, we continue to observe a signicant negative coe¢ cient for the
low-risk dummy and for the acquiring size. Although we recognize the limitations of this analysis,
given the decline in sample size (n=60), we argue that these results show that our main conclusions
are robust to the inclusion of target bank characteristics.
Third, the risk e¤ects that mergers produce for low-risk banks compared with the rest of the
sample may result from risk transfers between target and acquiring banks. We analyze whether low-
risk banks select targets which have a di¤erent risk proles compared with the rest of the sample.
For subsets of targets that were acquired by low-risk bidders and by other bidders, we compare
several target accounting ratios which are likely to capture the risk prole (ROA, leverage, cost
e¢ ciency and size). However, we do not nd evidence that the targets acquired by low-risk banks
di¤er with respect to their risk prole from the targets acquired by other bidders.
Finally, some studies have demonstrated the importance of the single currency on the Eu-
ropean banking industry. For example, Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009) show that the value e¤ects of
bidding bank shareholders have fallen since the establishment of European Monetary Union (EMU).
Similarly, Haq and Heaney (2009) point out that the euro has caused a decline in banking risk in
adopting countries and in countries neighboring EMU members. Since our analysis covers a sam-
ple period which partly coincides with EMU, we test if the adoption of the euro impacts the risk
e¤ects produced by bank mergers. We introduce a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for
mergers announced after 1999 (and zero otherwise). The variable enters the regression model with a
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negative coe¢ cient showing that EMU has decreased IADD (not signicant at conventional levels),
while leaving the ndings discussed in the previous section una¤ected. Controlling for euro e¤ects,
therefore, does not modify our ndings.
5 Conclusions
Sound nancial intermediation relies on banksability to manage risks e¤ectively. The default of
banking rms poses a di¢ cult trade-o¤ for policymakers between the negative externalities associ-
ated with institutional failures and costly government bailouts. Over past decades, repeated bank
merger waves have raised concerns among bank stakeholders as regards the risk implications of
nancial consolidation on individual banks and on the banking system as a whole.
This paper analyzes the impact of bank mergers on the default risk of a sample of European
bidders. We show that, on average, M&A does not modify the risk prole of acquiring banks.
Furthermore, we do not nd any evidence of a risk reduction via cross-border or activity-diversifying
M&A. However, the group of least risky banks before M&A experiences an increase in default risk
after completion of a deal. This risk increase is driven by diversifying deals (both cross-border and
activity diversifying deals) and is more prevalent under weak supervisory regimes. We conrm these
results in a multivariate setting where we control for a set of other possible determinants of the risk
e¤ects of M&A.
Overall, our results convey a critical view of the risk-reduction potential of bank M&A. Euro-
pean bank mergers, at best, are risk neutral, yet o¤er substantial scope for increases in the likelihood
of default. Our nding that merger-related risk increases are particularly large for cross-border and
activity diversifying deals, is consistent with a host of theoretical and empirical studies which doubt
that viable diversication gains and risk benets can be realized through bank consolidation. Fur-
ther, our nding that deal size exerts a negative inuence on industry-adjusted distance to default
raises concerns about the risk implications of banking mega-mergers on banking sector stability.
If risk reductions tend not to materialize, but there is a pronounced possibility that the
acquiring bank exhibits a higher default probability post-M&A, European policy makers should
consider the costs and benets of bank consolidation carefully. While our study concentrates on
20
acquiring bank risk, the risk implications of M&A for the wider banking sector and economy may be
less negative than our results suggest. From a supervisory point of view, increases in risk following
the completion of a merger might be justied if the deal involved a target which was substantially
more risky than the acquirer (and which in the absence of the deal may well have failed). In
this context, the e¤ects of M&A on systemic stability, particularly of deals which lead to more
complex banking organizations and deals which increase market concentration, remain unclear.
Future research into the risk implications of bank mergers should, hence, focus on the marginal
contribution of acquiring banks to systemic stability before and after M&A (see for example, Adrian
and Brunnermeier, 2009).
While we point out a number of drivers of merger-related changes in default risk, future
research should further understand the bank-specic drivers of risk-taking in the context of mergers.
For instance, it would be valuable to assess the impact of executive pay on the risk implications
of M&A. Outside the banking literature, Furne and Rosen (2009) assess the e¤ect of mergers
on the acquirers default risk. The authors identify executive remuneration (higher risk increases
occur when CEOs have a higher share of option-based compensation) and the level of asymmetric
information (expressed by the value of idiosyncratic volatility) as drivers of merger-related changes
in default risk.
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Table 1: Overview of M&A Sample 
Panel A: Distribution of M&A by year 
  Number of 
Mergers 
  Total Value   Average Value 
  n %   Mill USD %   Mill USD   
            
1992  3 2.24   417.33 0.08   139.11  
1993  2 1.49   388.37 0.07   194.18  
1994  4 2.99   6,780.94 1.22   1,695.23  
1995  8 5.97   4,675.02 0.84   584.38  
1996  8 5.97   8,123.31 1.47   1,015.41  
1997  13 9.70   71,524.06 12.91   5,501.85  
1998  13 9.70   63,687.18 11.50   4,899.01  
1999  17 12.69   120,615.57 21.77   7,095.03  
2000  16 11.94   61,570.94 11.12   3,848.18  
2001  11 8.21   45,150.49 8.15   4,104.59  
2002  5 3.73   2,912.14 0.53   582.43  
2003  3 2.24   4,848.20 0.88   1,616.07  
2004  4 2.99   24,473.13 4.42   6,118.28  
2005  9 6.72   35,994.10 6.50   3,999.34  
2006  12 8.96   62,154.68 11.22   5,179.56  
2007  6 4.48   40,620.48 7.33   6,770.08  
Total   134 100.00   553,935.94 
 
100.00       
Panel B: Geographic Distribution 
  
Acquirer nation Target nation 
 AU BE DE FI FR GE GR IR IT NE NO PT SP SW ST UK Other
s 
Total 
Austria (AU) 1                4 5 
Belgium (BE)  2        2        4 
Denmark (DE)   3        1       4 
Finland (FI)    2              2 
France (FR)     5    1        4 10 
Germany (GE) 2 1   1 4           3 11 
Greece (GR)       5          4 9 
Ireland (IR)        1        1  2 
Italy (IT)      1   28        1 30 
Luxembourg              2     2 
Netherlands (NE)  1       1 2       4 8 
Norway (NO)           3       3 
Portugal (PT)            5     1 6 
Spain (SP)            1 6   1 6 14 
Sweden (SW)    1          2   1 4 
Switzerland (ST)               3  1 4 
United Kingdom 
(UK) 
    1           7 8 16 
Total 3 4 3 3 7 5 5 1 30 4 4 6 8 2 3 9 37 134 
Deal values are in constant 2007-USD terms based on the Consumer Price Index (All Urban Consumers). 
Table 2: Bank Mergers and Industry-Adjusted Distance to Default 
The table reports mean (median) industry-adjusted distance to default (IADD) for a sample of acquiring banks. Distance 
to default before the merger is computed as the average of the distance to default over the period from -180 day to -11 
days relative to the announcement date (a), while the distance to default after the merger is computed as the average 
distance to default over the period from +11 days to +180 days after the effective date (c). The change in the industry-
adjusted distance to default is the difference between the post-effective date and the pre-announcement period IADD, 
winsorized at the 1%-level. The t-test (rank-test) evaluates if the mean (median), IADD and ∆IADD are equal to zero.  
 N 
Mean 
(t-stat) 
Median 
(z-stat) 
∆IADD>0 
    N % 
     
IADD: Pre-Merger (a-180,a -11) 134 -0.110 
(-0.759) 
-0.288*** 
(-2.668) 
 
IADD: Post- Merger (c+11, c+180)  134 -0.174 
(-1.144) 
-0.321*** 
(-3.235) 
 
∆IADD 134 -0.086 
(-0.698) 
-0.005 
(-0.567) 
67 50.0 
      
***(**;*) denotes significance at 1% (5%; 10%) 
 
 Table 3: Bank M&A on the Industry-Adjusted Distance to Default, by Deal Type 
Panel A reports the sample mean (median) of the industry-adjusted distance to default (IADD) for domestic and cross border deals. Panel B reports the 
sample mean (median) of the same risk measures computed for focusing and diversified mergers. A merger is defined as product diversifying if bidder and 
target do not share the same two-digit SIC code. Panel C summarizes the same statistics for mergers realized in high and low supervisory power regimes, 
identified on the basis of the Supervisory Power Index from Barth et al. (2004). For each bank, distance to default before the merger is computed as the 
average of the distance to default over the period from -180 day to -11 days from the announcement (a), while the distance to default after the merger is 
computed as the average of the distance to default over the period from +11 days to +180 days after the effective date (c). Changes in the industry-adjusted 
distance to default is the difference between the post-effective date and pre-announcement period IADD, winsorized at the 1%-level. The t-test (rank-test) 
evaluates if the mean (median) IADD and ∆IADD are equal to zero.   
 N Mean 
(t-stat) 
Median 
(z-stat) 
∆IADD>0 
(%) 
N Mean 
(t-stat) 
Median 
(z-stat) 
∆IADD>0 
(%) 
Panel A: Geographic diversification Domestic  Cross-Border 
IADD: Pre-Merger (a-180, a-11) 79 0.036 
(0.176) 
-0.202 
(-1.549) 
 55 -0.318 
(-1.636) 
-0.434*** 
(-2.296) 
 
IADD: Post- Merger (c+11, c+180)  79 0.026 
(0.113) 
-0.227* 
(-1.789) 
 55 0.460*** 
(-2.882) 
-0.537*** 
(-2.882) 
 
∆IADD  79 -0.047 
(-0.271) 
-0.038 
(-0.420) 
48.1 55 -0.142 
(-0.841) 
-0.067 
(-0.411) 
52.7 
Panel B: Product diversification Focusing  Diversifying 
IADD: Pre-Merger (a-180,a -11) 101 0.012 
(0.067) 
-0.290** 
(-2.265) 
 33 -0.480* 
(-1.947) 
-0.286 
(-1.599) 
 
IADD: Post- Merger (c+11,c +180)  101 -0.056 
(-0.297) 
-0.302** 
(-2.414) 
 33 -0.535** 
(-2.432) 
-0.419** 
(-2.260) 
 
∆IADD  101 -0.078 
(-0.549) 
0.013 
(-0.584) 
50.5 33 -0.110 
(-0.439) 
-0.023 
(-0.116) 
48.5 
Panel C: Supervisory Power High Supervisory Power Low Supervisory Power 
IADD: Pre-Merger (a-180, a-11) 56 -0.066 
(-0.325) 
-0.040 
(-0.889) 
 76 -0.147 
(-0.710) 
-0.474** 
(-2.397) 
 
IADD: Post- Merger (c+11, c+180)  56 0.046 
(0.194) 
-0.180 
(-0.710) 
 76 -0.354* 
(-1.750) 
-0.409*** 
(-3.909) 
 
∆IADD  56 0.045 
(0.225) 
0.063 
(-0.139) 
53.6 76 -0.197 
(-1.244) 
-0.055 
(-0.953) 
47.4 
     ***(**;*) denotes significance at 1% (5%; 10%) 
  
 
Table 4 Merger-related Changes in Industry-Adjusted Distance to Default, by Default Risk Quartiles 
This table reports mean (median) of industry-adjusted distance to default (IADD) for a sample of acquiring banks by pre-merger distance to default quartiles. Distance to default 
before the merger is computed as the average of the distance to default over the period from -180 day to -11 days from the announcement (a), while distance to default after the 
merger is computed as the average of the distance to default over the period from +11 days to +180 days after the effective date (c). Changes in industry-adjusted distance to 
default is the difference between the post-effective date and pre-event period IADD, winsorized at the 1%-level. The t-test (rank-test) evaluates if the mean (median) IADD and 
∆IADD are equal to zero. 
Industry-Adjusted  
Distance to Default Quartiles  
 N Mean 
(t-stat) 
Median 
(z-stat) 
∆IADD>0 
(%) 
IADD: Pre-Merger (a-180, a-11) 34 -1.719*** 
(-13.028) 
-1.534*** 
(-5.086) 
 
IADD: Post- Merger (c+11, c+180)  34 -1.448*** 
(-8,576) 
-1.260*** 
(-5.018) 
 
Q1  
LOW distance default  
(High-risk) 
∆IADD  34 0.217 
(0.988) 
0.290 
(1.410) 
61.8 
IADD: Pre-Merger (a-180,a -11) 33 -0.604*** 
(-18.126) 
-0.522*** 
(-5.012) 
 
IADD: Post- Merger (c+11, c+180)  33 -0.390* 
(-1.929) 
-0.379*** 
(-3.332) 
 
Q2 
∆IADD  33 0.187 
(0.971) 
0.190 
(0.652) 
60.6 
IADD: Pre-Merger (a-180, a-11) 34 0.044 
(1.353) 
0.072 
(1.308) 
 
IADD: Post- Merger (c+11, c+180)  34 0.045 
(0.291) 
0.060 
(0.248) 
 
Q3  
∆IADD  34 0.000 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(-0.145) 
50.0 
IADD: Pre-Merger (a-180, a-11) 33 1.885*** 
(5.562) 
1.062*** 
(5.012) 
 
IADD: Post- Merger (c+11, c+180)  33 1.130** 
(2.639) 
0.466** 
(2.314) 
 
Q4  
HIGH distance to default 
(Low-risk) 
∆IADD 33 -0.761** 
(-2.158) 
-0.788*** 
(-2.636) 
27.3 
***(**;*) denotes significance at 1% (5%; 10%) 
 Table 5: Risk Classes, Diversification and Changes in Industry-Adjusted Distance to Default 
Panel A reports mean (median) of the industry-adjusted distance to default (IADD) for domestic and cross border deals involving high- and low-
risk banks on the basis of their pre-merger distance to default. High- (Low-)risk banks are located in the first (fourth) DD quartile from -180 day 
to -11 days relative to the announcement date. Panel B reports the sample mean (median) of the same risk measures for activity-focusing and 
diversifying mergers. A merger is defined as diversified if the bidder and the target do not share the same two-digit SIC code. Distance to 
default before the merger is computed as the average distance to default over the period -180 day to -11 days from the announcement (a), while 
distance to default after the merger is computed as the average of distance to default over the period from +11 days to +180 days after the 
effective date (c). Changes in the industry-adjusted distance to default is the difference in IADD between the post-effective date and pre-
announcement period , winsorized at the 1%-level. The t-test (rank-test) evaluates if the mean (median) IADD and ∆IADD are equal to zero.   
  N Mean 
(t-stat) 
Median 
(z-stat) 
IADD>0 
(%) 
N Mean 
(t-stat) 
Median 
(z-stat) 
IADD>0 
(%) 
Panel A: Geographic Diversification Domestic  Cross-Border  
IADD: Pre-Merger (a-180, a-11) 18 -1.640*** 
(-8.571) 
-1.270*** 
(-3.724) 
 16 -1.807*** 
(-9.856) 
-1.688*** 
(-3.516) 
 
IADD: Post-Merger (c+11, c+180)  18 -1.404*** 
(-4.966) 
-1.167*** 
(-3.550) 
 16 -1.500 
(-8.512) 
-1.348*** 
(-3.516) 
 
 
High-risk 
banks 
∆IADD 18 0.132 
(0.364) 
0.150 
(0.588) 
55.6 16 0.311 
(1.329) 
0.336 
(1.344) 
68.8 
          
IADD: Pre-Merger (a-180, a-11) 18 2.387*** 
(4.572) 
1.333*** 
(3.724) 
 15 1.282*** 
(3.519) 
0.789*** 
(3.408) 
 
IADD: Post-Merger (c+11, c+180)  18 1.795** 
(2.523) 
0.661** 
(2.069) 
 15 0.332 
(1.043) 
0.426 
(1.022) 
 
 
Low-risk  
banks 
∆IADD 18 -0.604 
(-1.115) 
-0.730* 
(-1.677) 
27.8 15 -0.949** 
(-2.160) 
-0.788* 
(-1.931) 
26.7 
Panel B: Product Diversification Focusing Diversifying  
IADD: Pre-Merger (a-180, a-11) 23 -1.539*** 
(-11.649) 
-1.361*** 
(-4.197) 
 11 -2.095*** 
(-7.585) 
-1.804*** 
(-2.934) 
 
IADD: Post-Merger (c+11, c+180)  23 -1.424*** 
(-7.702) 
-1.252*** 
(-4.136) 
 11 -1.497*** 
(-4.104) 
-1.268 
(-2.847) 
 
 
High-risk 
banks 
∆IADD 23 0.115 
(0.521) 
0.013 
(0.547) 
52.2 11 0.429 
(0.842) 
0.473* 
(1.867) 
81.8 
          
IADD: Pre-Merger (a-180, a-11) 24 2.170*** 
(4.815) 
1.141*** 
(4.286) 
 9 1.124*** 
(6.726) 
1.062*** 
(2.666) 
 
IADD: Post Merger (c+11, c+180)  24 1.564*** 
(2.828) 
0.903** 
(2.457) 
 9 -0.026 
(-0.077) 
0.134 
(0.415) 
 
 
Low-risk  
banks 
 
∆IADD 24 -0.615 
(-1.340) 
-0.787* 
(-1.714) 
33.3 9 -1.151** 
(-2.680) 
-0.953** 
(-2.429) 
11.1 
***(**;*) denotes significance at 1% (5%; 10%)      
 
 Table 6: Risk Classes, Supervisory Power and Changes in Industry-Adjusted Distance to Default 
This table reports the sample mean (median) of the industry-adjusted distance to default (IADD) for a sample of acquiring banks, computed for 
the period before the announcement of the merger and for the period after the effective date for high or low-risk bidders in high and low 
supervisory power regimes. The regulatory system is identified on the basis of the Supervisory Power Index from Barth et al. (2004). Distance 
to default before the merger is computed as the average distance to default over the period from -180 day to -11 days from the announcement 
(a), while distance to default after the merger is computed as the average of distance to default over the period from +11 days to +180 days 
after the effective date (c) of the merger. These measures are then industry- adjusted as described in section 2.2. The change in the industry-
adjusted distance to default is the difference between the post-effective date and pre-announcement period IADD, winsorized at the 1%-level. 
The t-test (sign-test) evaluates the null hypothesis that the mean (median), IADD- Pre-Merger, IADD- Post-Merger and ∆IADD are equal to 
zero.  
  N Mean 
(t-stat) 
Median 
(z-stat) 
IADD>0 
(%) 
N Mean 
(t-stat) 
Median 
(z-stat) 
IADD>0 
(%) 
 High Supervisory Power Low Supervisory Power 
IADD: Pre-Merger (a-180, a-11) 9 -2.126*** 
(-7.502) 
-1.976*** 
(-2.666) 
 25 -1.572*** 
(-11.250) 
-1.286*** 
(-4.372) 
 
IADD: Post-Merger (c+11,c+180)  9 -1.784*** 
(-5.549) 
-1.570*** 
(-2.666) 
 25 -1.326*** 
(-6.754) 
-1.167*** 
(-4.265) 
 
 
High-risk 
banks 
∆IADD 9 0.032 
(0.057) 
0.707 
(0.652) 
66.7 25 0.283 
(1.245) 
0.287 
(1.224) 
60.0 
          
IADD: Pre-Merger (a-180, a-11) 14 1.546*** 
(3.286) 
0.831*** 
(3.296) 
 18 2.205*** 
(4.411) 
1.333*** 
(3.724) 
 
IADD: Post-Merger (c+11,c+180)  14 1.302** 
(2.322) 
1.168** 
(2.291) 
 18 1.022 
(1.536) 
0.222 
(0.980) 
 
 
Low-risk  
Banks 
∆IADD 14 -0.245 
(-0.440) 
-0.609 
(-0.847) 
42.9 18 -1.194** 
(-2.540) 
-0.898*** 
(-2.766) 
16.7 
***(**;*) denotes significance at 1% (5%; 10%)      
 
Table 7 Summary Statistics 
This table reports summary statistics for the measures of default risk, deal characteristics, acquirer characteristics, the regulatory environment and country control variables. The sample consists 
of 134 mergers announced over the period from 1992 to 2007 involving bidders in the European Union, Norway and Switzerland. All variables, apart from SUPOWER, are winsorized at the 1%-
level. 
  Definition N Mean Median Std.Dev. 5 Pctile 95 Pctile 
IADD: Pre-Merger (-180,-11) Pre-merger industry-adjusted distance to default 134 -0.110 -0.288 1.671 -2.261 2.824 
IADD: Post-Merger (+11,+180)  Post-merger industry-adjusted distance to default 134 -0.174 -0.321 1.756 -2.266 2.831 
Risk 
measures 
∆IADD Change in industry-adjusted distance to default 134 -0.086 -0.005 1.429 -2.346 1.652 
CASHONLY Equals 1 if the deal is completely cash-financed (zero otherwise) 134 0.209 0.000 0.408 0.000 1.000 
LISTED Equals 1 if the target is a listed company (zero otherwise) 134 0.515 1.000 0.502 0.000 1.000 
LDEALV Log of the deal value in million USD 134 6.761 6.645 1.830 3.892 9.609 
RELSIZE Ratio of the deal value to the acquirer’s  
market value (one year before announcement) 134 44.415 20.387 69.342 0.363 153.127 
CROSSB  Equals 1 for cross-border mergers (zero otherwise) 134 0.410 0.000 0.494 0.000 1.000 
CONGL Equals 1 if the acquirer and the target  
do not share the same two digit SIC code (zero otherwise) 134 0.246 0.000 0.432 0.000 1.000 
Deal 
characteristics 
DOMESTICFOCUS Equals 1 for mergers that are both domestic and focus (zero 
otherwise) 134 0.448 0.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 
PREMERGERPERF Buy and hold abnormal returns from -180 day to -11 days  
relative to the merger announcement (%) 134 -4.590 -4.140 20.590 -33.845 30.492 
ROA Pre-tax profits over total assets (%) 131 1.027 0.971 0.751 0.048 2.048 
MTBV Market to book ratio 132 2.214 2.072 1.143 0.791 4.841 
EQUITY Book value of common equity to total assets,  
orthogonalized with respect to total assets (%) 134 0.000 -0.260 2.111 -2.959 3.863 
OPCOSTS Total operating costs over total assets (%) 130 6.961 6.650 2.153 3.925 10.433 
SIZE Log of bidder total assets (thousands of USD) 134 18.076 18.206 1.700 14.629 20.338 
TOTAL ASSETS  Bidder total assets (USD millions) 134 232,754.9 104,981.1 305,907.8 3,149.032  816,735.1  
LOWRISK Equals 1 if the bidder is located in  
the lowest pre-merger risk quartile (zero otherwise) 134 0.246 0.000 0.432 0.000 1.000 
HIGHRISK Equals 1 if the bank is in  
the highest pre-merger risk quartile (zero otherwise) 134 0.254 0.000 0.437 0.000 1.000 
Acquirer  
Characteristics
CAR (-10, +1) Cumulative abnormal return between -10 days to +1 day  
relative the merger announcement  134 0.726 0.657 6.862 -9.677 13.721 
Regulatory 
environment 
SUPOWER Measures the extent to which the supervisory environment is 
sensitive to bank risk-taking, the breadth of disciplinary powers 
available to regulators, and how well these powers are enforced.  
Source: Barth et al. (2001) 132 8.985 9.000 2.389 6.000 13.000 
RGDPG Real GDP growth rate (%) 134 2.754 2.795 1.399 0.715 4.746 Country 
controls  HH Asset-based Herfindhal Index 134 0.098 0.088 0.060 0.030 0.231 
 
Table 8: Changes in Industry-adjusted Distance to Default: Deal and Acquirer Characteristics 
The dependent variable is the change in the industry-adjusted distance to default. The model is estimated via OLS with robust standard errors; t-
statistics are in parentheses. Deal characteristics include a dummy indicating if the merger is fully paid by cash (CASHONLY), a dummy 
indicating the target is a listed company (LISTED), the log of the deal value (LDLV), the ratio of deal value to the bidder’s market value of equity 
(RELSIZE), a dummy which is equal to 1 for cross-border mergers (CROSSB), a dummy which is equal to 1 if the bidder and the target do not 
share the same two digit SIC code (CONGLOMERATE) and a dummy equal to 1 if the merger is both domestic and focus (DOMESTICFOCUS). 
Acquirer characteristics include the buy and hold return for the period from -180 to -11 before the announcement net of the same return 
computed for the market index (PREMERGERPERF), the ratio between pre-tax profit and total assets (ROA), the market-to-book ratio (MTBV), 
the equity to assets ratio before the merger, orthogolized respect to size (EQUITY), the ratio of operating costs to total assets (OPCOSTS), the log 
of the bidder total assets at the end of the year before the announcement (SIZE), a dummy equal to 1 if the bidder is in the last quartile of the 
distribution of pre-merger industry-adjusted distance to default (LOWRISK), a dummy equal to 1 if the bidder is in the first quartile of the 
distribution of pre-merger industry-adjusted distance to default (HIGHRISK), the cumulative abnormal returns from -10 to + 1 day relative to the 
announcement date computed from a market model estimated over -120 to -11 days before the announcement (CAR (-10+1)). Other control 
variables include the real GDP growth rate (RGDPG) and an asset-based Herfindhal index of banking market concentration (HH). Panel B shows 
the marginal effects of LOWRISK on IADD when CONGL (CROSSB, DOMSTICFOCUS) is equal to 1. 
PANEL A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
CASHONLY -0.042 
(0.13) 
-0.039 
(0.12) 
0.055 
(0.15) 
0.075 
(0.22) 
0.051 
(0.14) 
0.072 
(0.20) 
0.043 
(0.11) 
0.139 
(0.41) 
0.058 
(0.17) 
LISTED 0.494* 
(1.76) 
0.495* 
(1.76) 
0.415 
(1.53) 
0.423 
(1.56) 
0.434 
(1.62) 
0.445* 
(1.66) 
0.407 
(1.50) 
0.483* 
(1.74) 
0.429 
(1.60) 
LDEALV -0.179** 
(2.20) 
-0.171** 
(2.16) 
-0.322*** 
(2.64) 
-0.310*** 
(2.86) 
-0.318** 
(2.62) 
-0.306*** 
(2.83) 
-0.318*** 
(2.75) 
-0.319*** 
(2.63) 
-0.286*** 
(2.88) 
RELSIZE 0.001 
(0.00) 
-0.020 
(0.12) 
0.222 
(1.00) 
0.204 
(1.01) 
0.223 
(1.04) 
0.206 
(1.06) 
0.222 
(1.00) 
0.211 
(0.87) 
0.193 
(0.90) 
CROSSB  -0.160 
(0.56) 
 -0.471 
(1.05) 
 -0.486 
(1.08) 
 -0.429 
(1.02) 
-0.557 
(1.24) 
 
CONGL 0.052 
(0.20) 
 0.022 
(0.07) 
 0.004 
(0.01) 
 0.020 
(0.06) 
0.326 
(0.96) 
 
DOMESTICFOCUS  0.251 
(0.91) 
 0.573 
(1.50) 
 0.596 
(1.57) 
  0.346 
(0.96) 
PREMERGERPERF   -0.408 
(0.52) 
-0.232 
(0.31) 
-0.440 
(0.55) 
-0.263 
(0.34) 
-0.409 
(0.52) 
-0.406 
(0.53) 
-0.224 
(0.30) 
ROA   -33.861 
(1.39) 
-38.846 
(1.51) 
-31.147 
(1.24) 
-35.893 
(1.36) 
-33.407 
(1.36) 
-32.014 
(1.33) 
-34.702 
(1.33) 
MTBV   0.188 
(0.86) 
0.187 
(0.87) 
0.162 
(0.73) 
0.157 
(0.72) 
0.187 
(0.87) 
0.183 
(0.88) 
0.167 
(0.84) 
EQUITY   11.410 
(1.50) 
12.417* 
(1.68) 
10.924 
(1.41) 
11.822 
(1.56) 
10.940 
(1.44) 
13.217* 
(1.72) 
11.043 
(1.46) 
OPCOSTS   -16.659** 
(2.22) 
-17.329** 
(2.27) 
-17.314** 
(2.26) 
-18.072** 
(2.32) 
-16.838** 
(2.15) 
-16.380** 
(2.22) 
-17.240** 
(2.34) 
SIZE   -0.038 
(0.29) 
-0.042 
(0.34) 
-0.034 
(0.26) 
-0.038 
(0.31) 
-0.040 
(0.30) 
-0.027 
(0.21) 
-0.044 
(0.36) 
LOWRISK -1.002** 
(2.59) 
-0.975** 
(2.54) 
-1.011** 
(2.47) 
-0.938** 
(2.33) 
-0.933** 
(2.28) 
-0.852** 
(2.14) 
-0.953 
(1.56) 
-0.677 
(1.33) 
-1.269*** 
(3.25) 
HIGHRISK     0.266 
(0.89) 
0.294 
(1.00) 
   
CAR (-10, +1)   -0.820 
(0.45) 
-0.967 
(0.56) 
-0.559 
(0.31) 
-0.687 
(0.40) 
-0.792 
(0.43) 
-1.194 
(0.62) 
-1.151 
(0.65) 
RGDPG   23.943* 
(1.82) 
22.865* 
(1.86) 
26.276* 
(1.92) 
25.473* 
(2.00) 
23.731* 
(1.78) 
25.227** 
(1.99) 
23.153* 
(1.92) 
HH   -1.379 
(0.58) 
-0.557 
(0.23) 
-1.635 
(0.71) 
-0.849 
(0.36) 
-1.379 
(0.58) 
-1.502 
(0.66) 
-0.621 
(0.26) 
LOWRISK 
× CROSSB 
      -0.129 
(0.18) 
  
LOWRISK 
× CONGL  
 
     
-1.177* 
(1.67) 
 
LOWRISK 
× DOMESTICFOCUS 
 
     
 0.882 
(1.17) 
Constant 1.177** 
(2.05) 
0.962* 
(1.86) 
3.450 
(1.37) 
3.036 
(1.18) 
3.308 
(1.30) 
2.864 
(1.12) 
3.463 
(1.36) 
3.101 
(1.29) 
3.035 
(1.18) 
Obs. 134 134 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 
Adjusted R2 0.063 0.075 0.094 0.111 0.091 0.110 0.086 0.110 0.120 
PANEL B Marginal effects 
    Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
LOWRISK + LOWRISK×  CROSSB   -1.082** 
(-2.33) 
  
LOWRISK + LOWRISK×  CONGL   -1.854*** 
(-3.66) 
 
LOWRISK + LOWRISK×  DOMESTICFOCUS     -0.387 
(-0.54) 
     
***(**;*) denotes significance at 1% (5%; 10%)        
Table 9: Changes in Industry-adjusted Distance to Default: The Regulatory Environment 
The dependent variable is the change in the industry-adjusted distance to default. The model is estimated via OLS with robust standard errors; t-
statistics are in parentheses. Deal characteristics include a dummy indicating if merger is fully paid by cash (CASHONLY), a dummy indicating the 
target is a listed company (LISTED), the log of the deal value (LDLV), the ratio of deal value to the bidder’s market value of equity (RELSIZE), a 
dummy which is equal to 1 for cross-border mergers (CROSSB), a dummy which is equal to 1 if the bidder and the target do not share the same two 
digit SIC code (CONGLOMERATE) and a dummy equal to 1 if the merger is both domestic and focus (DOMESTICFOCUS). Acquirer 
characteristics include the buy and hold return for the period from -180 to -11 before the announcement net of the same return computed for the 
market index (PREMERGERPERF), the ratio between pre-tax profit and total assets (ROA), the market-to-book ratio (MTBV), the equity to assets 
ratio before the merger, orthogolized respect to size (EQUITY), the ratio of operating costs to total assets (OPCOSTS), the log of the bidder total 
assets at the end of the year before the announcement (SIZE), a dummy equal to 1 if the bidder is in the last quartile of the distribution of pre-merger 
industry-adjusted distance to default (LOWRISK), a dummy equal to 1 if the bidder is in the first quartile of the distribution of pre-merger industry-
adjusted distance to default (HIGHRISK), the cumulative abnormal returns from -10 to + 1 day relative to the announcement date computed from a 
market model estimated over -120 to -11 days before the announcement (CAR (-10+1)). Other control variables include the real GDP growth rate 
(RGDPG) and an asset-based Herfindhal index of banking market concentration (HH). The regulatory environment is described through an index 
of the power of Supervisory Authorities in the bidder’s country from the WorldBank database on bank regulation and supervision (SUPOWER) . This 
index measures the degree to which the supervisory authority has the power to take specific actions against banks. DSUPOWER is a dummy which 
equals 1 if SUPOWER is above the sample median. Panel B shows the marginal effects of LOWRISK on IADD in three supervisory regimes: low 
(minimum value), median and high. (maximum value). 
Panel A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
CASHONLY 0.037 
(0.11) 
0.064 
(0.19) 
0.089 
(0.25) 
0.115 
(0.34) 
0.052 
(0.15) 
0.080 
(0.24) 
0.138 
(0.39) 
0.155 
(0.46) 
LISTED 0.430 
(1.54) 
0.418 
(1.51) 
0.412 
(1.44) 
0.399 
(1.42) 
0.432 
(1.55) 
0.420 
(1.52) 
0.387 
(1.34) 
0.375 
(1.32) 
LDEALV -0.323*** 
(2.65) 
-0.310*** 
(2.87) 
-0.314*** 
(2.67) 
-0.296*** 
(2.85) 
-0.321** 
(2.62) 
-0.308*** 
(2.83) 
-0.289** 
(2.44) 
-0.272** 
(2.56) 
RELSIZE 0.241 
(1.02) 
0.216 
(1.00) 
0.231 
(1.02) 
0.205 
(1.00) 
0.238 
(1.04) 
0.213 
(1.02) 
0.233 
(1.02) 
0.208 
(1.01) 
CROSSB  -0.486 
(1.04) 
 -0.546 
(1.19) 
 -0.478 
(1.04) 
 -0.526 
(1.19) 
 
CONGL 0.030 
(0.09) 
 0.053 
(0.17) 
 0.028 
(0.09) 
 0.103 
(0.33) 
 
DOMESTICFOCUS  0.606 
(1.50) 
 0.647 
(1.62) 
 0.591 
(1.47) 
 0.595 
(1.51) 
PREMERGERPERF -0.436 
(0.55) 
-0.261 
(0.34) 
-0.462 
(0.60) 
-0.272 
(0.37) 
-0.407 
(0.52) 
-0.234 
(0.31) 
-0.496 
(0.65) 
-0.306 
(0.41) 
ROA -29.725 
(1.20) 
-35.594 
(1.38) 
-31.223 
(1.26) 
-37.431 
(1.43) 
-30.976 
(1.26) 
-36.825 
(1.43) 
-32.031 
(1.32) 
-38.116 
(1.48) 
MTBV 0.154 
(0.69) 
0.155 
(0.69) 
0.149 
(0.72) 
0.150 
(0.71) 
0.161 
(0.69) 
0.163 
(0.70) 
0.147 
(0.68) 
0.150 
(0.68) 
EQUITY 11.137 
(1.44) 
12.386 
(1.65) 
14.450* 
(1.84) 
15.705** 
(2.08) 
10.842 
(1.39) 
12.026 
(1.60) 
14.260* 
(1.87) 
15.353** 
(2.11) 
OPCOSTS -16.720** 
(2.19) 
-17.527** 
(2.25) 
-17.142** 
(2.20) 
-17.990** 
(2.26) 
-16.125** 
(2.08) 
-16.869** 
(2.13) 
-16.445** 
(2.07) 
-17.189** 
(2.11) 
SIZE -0.032 
(0.24) 
-0.034 
(0.28) 
-0.040 
(0.32) 
-0.046 
(0.39) 
-0.028 
(0.21) 
-0.030 
(0.24) 
-0.051 
(0.41) 
-0.057 
(0.47) 
LOWRISK -1.030** 
(2.50) 
-0.967** 
(2.40) 
-2.737* 
(1.89) 
-2.629* 
(1.87) 
-1.017** 
(2.44) 
-0.954** 
(2.34) 
-1.524*** 
(3.18) 
-1.414*** 
(3.05) 
CAR (-10, +1) -0.754 
(0.39) 
-0.817 
(0.45) 
-0.696 
(0.37) 
-0.747 
(0.42) 
-0.761 
(0.40) 
-0.824 
(0.46) 
-0.413 
(0.21) 
-0.471 
(0.26) 
RGDPG 24.028* 
(1.82) 
22.604* 
(1.85) 
23.405* 
(1.82) 
21.721* 
(1.86) 
24.195* 
(1.85) 
22.813* 
(1.87) 
24.843** 
(2.03) 
22.966** 
(2.04) 
HH -1.971 
(0.81) 
-1.116 
(0.44) 
-1.791 
(0.75) 
-0.859 
(0.34) 
-1.656 
(0.69) 
-0.795 
(0.32) 
-1.971 
(0.84) 
-0.971 
(0.40) 
SUPOWER 0.045 
(0.58) 
0.049 
(0.66) 
-0.009 
(0.11) 
-0.004 
(0.05)     
SUPOWER 
× LOWIRSK 
  0.192 
(1.19) 
0.188 
(1.20) 
    
DSUPOWER     0.161 
(0.54) 
0.172 
(0.58) 
-0.120 
(0.38) 
-0.087 
(0.28) 
DSUPOWER 
× LOWIRSK 
      1.231* 
(1.74) 
1.124 
(1.63) 
Constant 3.022 
(1.16) 
2.541 
(0.94) 
3.681 
(1.45) 
3.197 
(1.20) 
3.188 
(1.25) 
2.743 
(1.04) 
3.592 
(1.48) 
3.170 
(1.24) 
Obs. 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 
Adjusted R2 0.089 0.107 0.102 0.120 0.087 0.105 0.111 0.123 
Panel B Marginal effects 
 Model 3 Model 4 Model 7 Model 8 
Low supervisory 
power 
-1.775** 
(-2.51) 
-1.690** 
(-2.46) 
-1.524*** 
(3.18) 
-1.414*** 
(3.05) 
Median supervisory 
power 
-1.006** 
(-2.52) 
-0.940** 
(-2.40) 
  
High supervisory  
power 
-0.045 
(-0.05) 
-0.001 
(-0.00) 
-0.293 
(-0.50) 
-0.289 
(-0.49) 
***(**;*) denotes significance at 1% (5%; 10%)   
